This paper proposes a formal model of the Bellare-Rogaway type [1] that enables one to prove the security of an anonymous credential system in a complexity theoretic framework. The model abstracts away from how a specific instance of anonymous credential system achieves its goals; instead it defines what these goals are. The notions of credential unforgeability, non-transferability, pseudonym unlinkability and pseudonym owner protection are formally defined and the relationships between them are explored. The model is a step towards a formal treatment of the level of privacy protection that anonymous credential systems can and should achieve, both in terms of pseudonym unlinkability and user anonymity.
Introduction

Background and motivation
Anonymous credential or 'pseudonym' systems allow users to interact with organisations using distinct and unlinkable pseudonyms. In particular, a user can obtain a credential (a statement of a designated type that attests to one or more of the user's attributes) from one organisation and then 'show' it to another, such that the two organisations cannot link the issuing and showing acts; this renders the user's transactions unlinkable. Of course this unlinkability is limited; if only one credential is ever issued with a particular set of attributes, then clearly all credential showings containing this set of attributes can be linked to each other and to the unique issued credential. Pseudonym systems must prevent users from showing credentials that have not been issued (i.e. they must guarantee 'credential unforgeability'), and prevent users from pooling their credentials (for example, to collectively obtain a new credential that each user individually would not be able to). This latter property is usually referred to as 'credential non-transferability'.
Security models of pseudonym systems, and proofs (where given), do not usually allow reasoning about the resulting degrees of user anonymity and pseudonym unlinkability. This paper, following the ideas first set out by Bellare and Rogaway in [1] , proposes a model that is based on complexity theoretic arguments and which potentially leads to information theoretic anonymity
What we do not do
Our model does not capture 'traditional' communications security properties, such as entity authentication. This is not an omission; these issues are outside the scope of the model (other well-established security models can be used to reason about such issues). Of course, if users do not authenticate organisations, and if the communications in the system are not appropriately protected at the session level 1 , then there cannot be any security. However, the way these services are provided lies at a different level of abstraction. We therefore assume that they are provided by the infrastructure that allows users and organisations to communicate. We also assume that, within this infrastructure, users remain anonymous to organisations (i.e. we assume an anonymous user-to-organisation channel).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the formal model of pseudonym systems. Section 2.2 establishes the notions of pseudonym owner protection, credential unforgeability and credential non-transferability, which together capture the notions of soundness for a scheme. Further, section 2.3 provides a brief discussion of the notions and explains the relationships between them. Section 2.4 establishes the notion of pseudonym unlinkability which is discussed in section 2.5. Section 2.6 then establishes the notion of pseudonym indistinguishability and shows it is a necessary condition for unlinkability. Finally, section 2.7 addresses the issue of anonymity in pseudonym systems, while section 3 concludes the paper and gives directions for further research.
Security of pseudonym systems
In this section we describe our model of a pseudonym system. We regard a pseudonym system as being comprised of the players in the system and the procedures through which they interact. The players, in particular, are divided into users, issuing organisations and verifying organisations. Since users are known to each organisation under a different pseudonym, indeed possibly under multiple pseudonyms, a procedure must be in place according to which a user and an organisation establish a new pseudonym; we call this the 'pseudonym establishment protocol'. Procedures must also be in place that allow users to obtain credentials (using the pseudonym that was established with the issuer) and to show them (using the pseudonym that was established with the verifier). We call the former the 'credential issuing protocol' and the latter the 'credential showing protocol'.
In our model, credential types are in one-to-one correspondence with (combinations of) user attributes; in other words, each combination of attributes defines a credential type. An organisation that, for example, issues demographic credentials containing the fields sex and age group, with possible values of {male,female} and {18-, 18-30,30-50,50+} respectively, in our model may actually issue credentials of up to eight different types (one for each combination of values).
The model
A protocol prot is assumed to be a tuple of interactive Turing machines; an execution of prot is said to be successful if and only if all machines accept. The set of all non-zero polynomial functions in the natural number k is denoted by poly(k). A real-valued function : N → R, is said to be negligible in k if and only if 0 ≤ (k) < 1/|q(k)| for any q ∈ poly(k) and for all sufficiently large k.
Remark 1
We are concerned in this paper with situations where two functions f and g satisfy f (k) > g(k) + (k) for any negligible function and for all sufficiently large k. To simplify the discussion we abuse our notation slightly and simply say that f is greater than g + (k), i.e. we omit explicit references to k, and we also omit the rider 'for all sufficiently large k'.
Definition 1 A pseudonym system is a tuple
whose elements are as follows.
• U is the set of users.
• I is the set of credential issuing organisations ('issuers' in short).
• V is the set of credential verifying organisations ('verifiers' in short).
• k (a natural number) is the system security parameter.
• init is the initialisation algorithm; on input (U, I, V, k), it outputs descriptions of the sets P and T . Depending on the particular scheme, it may also output public parameters and private values for (a subset of ) the players in the scheme, i.e. users, issuers and verifiers.
• P is the set of pseudonyms.
• T is the set of credential types.
• peprot is the pseudonym establishment protocol: any user/organisation pair 
We denote the set of active credential types in the system by T * def = i∈I T i . It is required that |T * | ∈ poly(k). Also note that, by definition, |U | ∈ poly(k), |I| ∈ poly(k) and |V | ∈ poly(k).
The games and soundness
In order to formalise our notions of security for a pseudonym system, we define a series of games between two Turing machines: a Challenger and an Adversary. Each game captures a specific property of the pseudonym system. In this section we define Game 1, which captures 'pseudonym owner protection', Game 2, which captures 'credential unforgeability', and Game 3, which captures 'credential non-transferability'. In sections 2.4 and 2.6 below we define Game 4 and Game 5, which capture 'unlinkability' and 'indistinguishability' of pseudonyms, respectively.
At the beginning of all games, the Challenger sets up the system by selecting the set of users U , issuers I, verifiers V , and a security paramenter k and by running init with these as input. At this point, the Challenger controls all the players in the system. He defines the sets T i for each issuer. The Adversary, which is assumed to be a probabilistic polynomial time (and space) algorithm and is denoted by A, then receives as input the sets U , I, V and T i , descriptions of the sets P and T , and the system's public information. As explained above, it is assumed that the underlying communication infrastructure appropriately protects the communications between users and organisations at the session level. Thus, A models a passive adversary that faithfully transmits messages between parties.
Each of the games consists of two distinct and successive phases. During the first phase of each game, A may issue (oracle type) queries to the Challenger; during the second phase he may not. During the first phase of Game 1, 2 and 3, A may issue the following types of query to the Challenger.
runpeprot(u, o):
A may arbitrarily select a user/organisation pair (u, o) ∈ U × (I ∪ V ) and issue this query. When this happens, the Challenger makes u and o execute peprot u,o,p . The Challenger replies true if the protocol execution is successful and false otherwise. (If the execution is successful, u and o will have established a new pseudonym p ∈ P ; A, however, does not learn its value.)
runciprot(u, i, t):
A may arbitrarily select a user/issuer pair (u, i) ∈ U × I and a credential type t ∈ T i and issue this query. When this happens, the Challenger selects a pseudonym p from set of pseudonyms that u and i have established 4 and makes u and i execute ciprot i,p,t . He replies true if the protocol execution is successful and false otherwise (including the case where u and i have not established any pseudonym). Note that A does not learn the value of p.
runcsprot(u, v, t):
A may arbitrarily select a user/verifier pair (u, v) ∈ U ×V and a credential type t ∈ T and issue this query. When this happens, the Challenger selects a pseudonym p from the set of pseudonyms that u and v have established and makes u and v execute csprot v,p,t . He replies true if the protocol execution is successful and false otherwise (including the case where u and v have not established any pseudonym). Note that A does not learn the value of p.
corruptUser(u):
A may arbitrarily select a user u ∈ U and issue this query. When this happens, the Challenger hands all the private information of u to A. This includes u's pseudonyms, credentials and all his past protocol views. From that point on, the control of u is passed from the Challenger to A.
corruptIssuer(i):
A may arbitrarily select an issuer i ∈ I and issue this query. When this happens, the Challenger hands all the private information of i to A. This includes the set of pseudonyms i has established and all its past protocol views. From that point on, the control of i is passed from the Challenger to A.
corruptVerifier(v):
A may arbitrarily select a verifier v ∈ V and issue this query. When this happens, the Challenger hands all the private information of v to A. This includes the set of pseudonyms v has established and all its past protocol views. From that point on, the control of v is passed from the Challenger to A.
In all games, a global and monotonically increasing variable τ counts A's queries. We say that the query is issued at the time indicated by τ . At some point in time, A exits the first phase and enters the second phase. The value of τ at that point is denoted by τ max . In the second phase A may no longer issue any queries; what happens is specific to each game and is described below.
To describe the games we require some additional notation. In the following, P u,o ⊆ P denotes the set of pseudonyms the user u ∈ U has established with the organisation o ∈ (I ∪ V )
The set of pseudonyms belonging to u is defined as P u def = o∈(I∪V ) P u,o and the set of pseudonyms that o has established is defined as P o def = u∈U P u,o . (Since A does not learn the value of pseudonyms during their establishment, only u knows P u and only o knows P o .) The set of active pseudonyms in the system is defined as P * def = u∈U P u , or, equivalently,
The function f : P * → U maps pseudonyms to their owners, which is well-defined by the assumption that P u ∩ P u = ∅.
LetÛ ⊆ U ,Î ⊆ I andV ⊆ V denote the subsets of users, issuers and verifiers respectively that A corrupted during the first phase. Further, let P u,t (x) ⊆ P u denote the subset of pseudonyms belonging to user u ∈ U on which a credential of type t ∈ T * has been issued prior to time x, i.e.
We now describe the second phase of Games 1, 2 and 3. As mentioned above, A may no longer issue queries to the Challenger in this phase. He may, however, engage in ciprot p,i,t and csprot p,v,t executions directly with organisations (while pretending to be the user f (p)). 
Game 1 (pseudonym owner protection): A selects a pseudonym/verifier/type triple
We say that A wins the game iff he can make v accept in a csprot p,v,t execution. 
Game 3 (credential non-transferability): A selects a pseudonym/verifier/type triple
(p, v, t) ∈ P * × (V −V ) × (T − i∈Î T i ) such that P f (p),t (τ max ) = ∅.
Discussion
Game 1, 'pseudonym owner protection', captures security for users; nobody -even when colluding with users, issuers and verifiers -should be able to successfully show a credential on a pseudonym of which he is not the owner (i.e. on a pseudonym which was not established by himself). The property is typically achieved by having the pseudonym establishment protocol generate some private output for the user. This output is then treated as a secret that enables the user to authenticate himself as the pseudonym owner during the execution of the credential issuing and showing protocols.
Games 2 and 3 capture security for organisations. In particular, Game 2 captures what is usually perceived as 'credential unforgeability'. If a (dishonest) user can construct a credential by himself (i.e. without obtaining it legitimately from an issuing organisation), if, in other words, the user can forge the credential, then the system clearly does not offer credential unforgeability. Game 2 captures unforgeability in this sense. There is, however, a simplistic way for a user to 'forge' a credential, namely by 'borrowing' it from another user with whom he colludes (and who legitimately obtained the credential from an issuing organisation). This type of 'forgery' is not captured by Game 2. In some applications credential sharing is not a concern, while forgery is.
Game 3, credential non-transferability, captures the case of credential sharing between users. In a system that offers credential non-transferability, no user can successfully show a credential of a type he was never issued. This holds even in the case the user colludes with other users that have been issued credentials of that type.
It is interesting to observe the relationship between the notions of unforgeability and nontransferability: the latter, being stronger, implies the former. Clearly, if a dishonest user can construct credentials by himself, there is no need for him to collude with other users in order to forge one. In the model, this is simply reflected by the fact that the adversary is more restricted in his choice of the credential type in the (second phase of) Game 2 than he is in the (second phase of) Game 3. A system that offers non-transferability also offers unforgeability.
This relationship between unforgeability and non-transferability motivates the following definition of a sound pseudonym system.
Definition 3 A pseudonym system is said to be sound if it offers pseudonym owner protection and credential non-transferability.
As a side comment, note that non-transferability of credentials is probably the most challenging property for a pseudonym system to achieve. How can colluding users be prevented from sharing their credentials? Certainly, if two users share all their secrets, then they can act as each other in all circumstances. Thus, one will always have to assume that users will not share all their secrets, either because they will be prevented by some means, e.g. by the use of tamper-resistant hardware, or because they will be given a sufficiently strong incentive not to. Examples of schemes that follow the latter strategy include the ones in [7] , where sharing credentials implies sharing a highly valued key (this is called 'PKI-assured non-transferability'), and [3] , where sharing one credential implies sharing all credentials (this is called 'all-or-nothing non-transferability').
Unlinkability of pseudonyms
We now define Game 4 in order to capture the first privacy property required of pseudonym systems, i.e. the property of pseudonym unlinkability. A second (weaker) privacy property is defined in section 2.6.
In the first phase of the Game 4, A is allowed to issue queries from the following set of query types, which are similar but not identical to the first three query types of section 2.2.
runpeprot(o):
A may arbitrarily select an organisation o ∈ (I ∪ V ) and issue this query. When this happens, the Challenger selects a user u according to a probability distribution D from U and makes u and o execute peprot u,o,p . He replies true if the protocol execution is successful and false otherwise. (If the execution is successful, A knows that u and o have established a new pseudonym p ∈ P but learns neither p nor the identity of its owner.)
runciprot(p, i, t):
A may arbitrarily select a pseudonym/issuer pair (p, i) ∈ P × I and a credential type t ∈ T i and issue this query. When this happens, the Challenger selects the owner of p and makes him execute ciprot i,p,t with i. He replies true if the protocol execution is successful and false otherwise (including the case where p has no owner). Note that A does not learn who the owner of p is.
runcsprot(p, v, t):
A may arbitrarily select a pseudonym/verifier pair (p, v) ∈ P × V and a credential type t ∈ T and issue this query. When this happens, the Challenger selects the owner of p and makes him execute csprot v,p,t with v. He replies true if the protocol execution is successful and false otherwise (including the case where p has no owner). Note that A does not learn who the owner of p is. We now describe the second phase of the Game 4. We denote the set of pseudonyms that belong to uncorrupted users by P * * def = P * − u∈Û P u .
Game 4 (pseudonym unlinkability):
A outputs two distinct pseudonyms p 1 , p 2 ∈ P * * . We say that A wins the game iff f (p 1 ) = f (p 2 ).
A may apply a variety of strategies in his effort to correlate pseudonyms. We now consider what is probably the most naive strategy and arrive at the following simple result.
Lemma 1 If the Challenger, during runpeprot(o) queries of an instance of Game 4, selects users uniformly at random (i.e. D is the uniform distribution)
, and two pseudonyms, p 1 , p 2 say, are chosen at random from P * * , then the probability that
. Then the probability that f (p 2 ) = u is 1/|U −Û |, since the pseudonyms are allocated uniformly at random to users, and hence also to uncorrupted users. The result follows.
Thus it is tempting to define a pseudonym system that offers unlinkability of pseudonyms as a system where A cannot win the Game 4 with probability greater than 1/|U −Û | + (k) for any negligible function . However, this is only a reasonable definition of unlinkability if D is the uniform distribution and if no credentials are shown during the first phase of the game, i.e. there are no instances of runcsprot. Any instance of runcsprot potentially provides the adversary with information about possible links between pseudonyms, and hence potentially increases the adversary's probability of success in linking pseudonyms. Thus, the definition of pseudonym unlinkability needs to take this additional information into account.
Assuming a sound pseudonym system, there are two types of deduction that can be made.
• Suppose a runcsprot invocation, say runcsprot(p, v, t) for some p, v and t, issued at time τ , returns true. Then A can deduce that there exists some p ∈ u∈U P u,t (τ ) such that f (p) = f (p ).
• Suppose a runcsprot invocation, say runcsprot(p, v, t) for some p, v and t, issued at time τ , returns false. Then A can deduce that f (p) = f (p ) for all p ∈ u∈U P u,t (τ ).
In any instance of Game 4, which in its first phase will involve a series of queries, A will be able to make a series of deductions about matchings of pseudonyms based on the outcomes ({true,false}) of runcsprot queries (as above). As a result, for each pair of distinct pseudonyms p 1 , p 2 ∈ P * * , A will be able to compute the probability P p1,p2 that f (p 1 ) = f (p 2 ) based on these observations (assuming that A makes optimal use of the information provided). In computing P p 1 ,p 2 we suppose that A also takes into account the probability distribution D used by the Challenger to select the user during runpeprot queries.
We now defineP to be the maximum of these probabilities, i.e.
We can now define the notion of pseudonym unlinkability.
Definition 4 A sound pseudonym system is said to offer pseudonym unlinkability iff no A can win Game 4 with probability greater thanP + (k) for any negligible function .
An example scenario of how the two types of deduction might be applied in order to calculatē P , is given in the Appendix.
Discussion
In real life, colluding organisations could come up with many more effective strategies in order to correlate pseudonyms. Examples include attacks that take into account information such as the time or the geographical location of events that occur in the system. These attacks, however, are not captured by the model, simply because they lie at a different level of abstraction. Protection against, say, timing attacks, de-anonymising traffic analysis or social engineering, is required irrespectively of which particular pseudonym system is being used. The only adversarial strategies to correlate pseudonyms that are inherent in the system, and therefore lie at the same level of abstraction, are the following.
1. If some user is asked for but fails to produce a credential of a given type, the colluding organisations know that none of the pseudonyms on which a credential of that type was previously issued belongs to that user.
2. If some user successfully shows a credential of a given type on one of his pseudonyms, the colluding organisations know that at least one of the pseudonyms on which a credential of that type was previously issued belongs to that user.
These strategies are captured by the probability boundP . A pseudonym system cannot protect against these strategies without breaching one of its essential properties: that of credential non-transferability. In other words, if a (sound) pseudonym system satisfies Definition 4, this means that the probability that pseudonyms can be successfully linked does not exceed the given bound (by a non-negligible quantity), provided that no 'out-of-scope' attacks place.
Indistinguishability of pseudonyms
We now establish our second privacy property, namely the notion of indistinguishability of pseudonyms and show that it is a necessary condition for pseudonym unlinkability.
Consider the following game between a Challenger and a polynomial time (and space) adversary A. First, the Challenger chooses sets of users U , issuers I, and verifiers V , a sound pseudonym system and a security parameter k. On input U, I, V, k, he runs init and gives the set U of users to A. A then chooses two users u 0 , u 1 ∈ U and gives them to the Challenger. The Challenger now flips an unbiased random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and makes u b execute peprot u,o,p with some organisation o ∈ (I ∪ V ). He then gives o's private information (including the protocol view and the resulting pseudonym p) to A. A u then plays three instances of Game 5 (indistinguishability) with A i ; in all these games he defines the set of users to be U = {u 0 , u 1 } and the collection of organisations to be (I ∪ V ) = {o}. A u will use A i 's ability to win instances of Game 5 in order to win, with non-negligible probability, the instance of Game 4. To this end, in the first instance of Game 5, he gives the pseudonym p 1 together with o's private information and corresponding peprot view to A i . Similarly, in the second and third instances he gives p 2 and p 3 respectively (together with o's private information and corresponding peprot views) to A i . Denote A i 's output occurring in the three instances of Game 5 by b 1 , b 2 and b 3 respectively. Now, since we have assumed that A i breaks pseudonym indistinguishability, we suppose that A i wins all instances of Game 5 with probability 1/2 + δ(k), where δ(k) > µ(k) for all sufficiently large k.
where the pair (j, j ) exists by the pigeonhole principle, and outputs (p j , p j ). Now, since
where was assumed to be negligible. Thus A u breaks unlinkability, contradicting our assumption, and the result follows.
Anonymity of users
Consider a sound pseudonym system that offers pseudonym unlinkability. The owner u ∈ (U −Û ) of pseudonym p (u = f (p)) is hidden in the anonymity set U −Û because, from A's point of view, any user in that set could potentially be the owner of p. The effective size of the anonymity set, however, depends on the probability distribution D according to which users are selected during pseudonym establishment. Using the information-theoretic anonymity metric of [8, 9] , this is given by −Σ p∈P * * Pr(f (p) = u) log 2 [Pr(f (p) = u)] and is maximised if D is the uniform distribution. In this case the effective size of the anonymity set for all pseudonyms is log 2 |U −Û |. It is worth observing that, in the general case, it makes sense to consider the anonymity of the user while acting using a particular pseudonym. In other words, it is likely that the anonymity a user enjoys will depend on the pseudonym under which he is acting.
The above measure of anonymity only applies to a naive adversary; it only takes into account the a priori knowledge (i.e. the distribution D). After observing the system for some time, in the sense of Game 4, A may decrease the unlinkability between pseudonyms. This decrease in unlinkability yields an a posteriori probability distribution D , that A is able to construct using deductions that he can make due to the scheme's soundness. While it is the distribution D that defines the (effective) size of the anonymity set in which users are hidden (while acting under one of their pseudonyms), this does not necessarily mean that a reduction in unlinkability implies a reduction in anonymity in the theoretical definition of the term. Of course, in practice, any linking of pseudonyms is likely to lead to an increased risk of loss of anonymity because of 'out of scope' attacks. As a result, unlinkability is a property of great importance in its own right.
Future work and concluding remarks
In this paper we have introduced a complexity theoretic model for anonymous credential systems. We have formally defined the notions of pseudonym owner protection, credential unforgeability, credential non-transferability and pseudonym unlinkability. A key challenge is thus to construct scheme(s) that meet the definitions in this model, and/or to prove, under appropriate assumptions, the security of existing ones. There is, however, room to refine and extend the model itself; determining the probabilityP by which colluding organisations should be bound when trying to correlate pseudonyms, given a specific history of events in the system, is clearly of importance. Naive strategies for computingP appear to be of exponential complexity. Hence, incorporating efficient strategies for computing, approximating or boundingP into the model is a desirable refinement. It is envisaged that a refined version of the model described above will combine complexity theory and probability theory in order to describe the resulting degrees of unlinkability and anonymity using recently proposed information theoretic metrics [8, 9] . This should provide further insight into the inherent limits of unlinkability and anonymity in credential systems. We believe that this will also provide insight as to what such systems have to achieve in order not to be considered the weakest link with respect to the overall system of which they form part. An extended version of the model could capture additional properties of pseudonym systems, for example credentials that can be shown only a limited number of times, or a capability for anonymity revocation.
Another direction for future research is the analysis of real-world distributions D of pseudonymto-user mappings. This might lead to the description of strategies that users might follow, in a realistic setting, in order to maximise the unlinkability of their pseudonyms. Given the statistical properties of the context, this could also lead to descriptions of how long any given pseudonym can be kept before it should be renewed (if the context allows for this).
